Fiscal Reform Agenda: Getting Ready for the Bumpy Ride Ahead by Manasan, Rosario G.
Policy Notes
August 2004 No. 2004-08
PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE
FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES




the bumpy ride ahead
Rosario G. Manasan*
________________
*The author is Senior Research Fellow at the Philippine Insti-
tute for Development Studies (PIDS).
PIDS Policy Notes are observations/analyses written by PIDS research-
ers on certain policy issues. The treatise is holistic in approach and
aims to provide useful inputs for decisionmaking.
This Notes is based on PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 2004-26
with the same title by the same author. The views expressed are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of PIDS or any of the
study's sponsors.
s shown in the analysis and picture drawn in
the preceding Policy Notes (PN No. 2004-07),
the Philippines’ fiscal position, in particular
its public sector fiscal situation, is the country’s
most critical problem today and the urgency of addressing
such problem cannot be overemphasized.
A number of areas of reform have been identified to help
resolve this fiscal fix. Two of them refer to reforms on the
revenue side (tax policy and tax administration reforms) and
one, to reforms on the expenditure side (public expenditure
management reforms). There are also reforms to be estab-
lished regarding the management of government-owned and/
or -controlled corporations (GOCCs).
In this regard, it must be noted that based on the analysis,
the burden of adjustment should rest more on the revenue
side. Thus, both tax policy and tax administration reforms
are of utmost importance and must be undertaken in tan-
dem with one another.
On the other hand, there is no room for further cuts in na-
tional government expenditures in the aggregate. Govern-
ment spending for infrastructure and human capital invest-
ments is severely inadequate and this lack acts as a drag
on the country’s economic growth prospects. Still, this does
not mean that reforms are not needed on the expenditure
side. With or without a fiscal problem, reforms in public
expenditure management are essential in ensuring that the
government gets the biggest bang out of every peso that it
spends. Consequently, minimizing waste and curbing cor-
ruption should be on top of the agenda. At the same time, it
is crucial that the fiscal problems of the GOCC sector are
attended to.
How do we get there? This Policy Notes discusses the ar-
eas of reform in detail.
Tax policy reform
Numerous proposals for amending the tax structure have
been put on the table by various groups. President Gloria
Arroyo herself unveiled eight new Palace-backed tax mea-
sures in a speech before the members of the Makati Busi-
ness Club and the Philippine Chamber of Commerce, namely:
(1) shift to gross from net income taxation for corporations
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and self-employed individuals, (2) a two-step increase in
the VAT and, possibly, a repeal of the VAT, (3) indexation of
the excise tax on sin products, (4) indexation of the excise
tax on petroleum products, (5) limiting of fiscal incentives,
(6) imposition of a tax on the windfall income of telecommu-
nications companies, (7) targeted tax amnesty, and (8) in-
stitutionalization of a performance-driven system for revenue
collection agencies (BusinessWorld, July 23-24, 2004, p.
1). Prior to this, the government already approved an in-
crease in the duty on petroleum products from 3 percent to
5 percent.
Meanwhile, other sectors have also put forward other tax
measures that include, among others: (1) reduction in the
exemptions from the VAT, (2) use of presumptive income
levels for self-employed individuals, (3) imposition of an
across-the-board import surcharge, (4) imposition of an ex-
cise tax on text messaging, (5) increase in the motor ve-
hicle registration fees, otherwise known as the road user
tax, (6) imposition of a franchise tax on telecommunication
firms in lieu of the VAT, (7) wider coverage and increase in
the rate of excise tax on luxury consumption, (8) increase in
minimum gross receipts applicable to common carriers tax,
(9) reduction in the corporate/individual income tax rates,
(10) creation of an independent revenue authority, and (11)
increase of the fees for government services.
The merits and demerits of these proposals will have to be
evaluated on the basis of four criteria: (1) their ability to
raise revenues, (2) ease of administration, (3) tax neutral-
ity/ horizontal equity, and (4) vertical equity. In the near
term, the first and second criteria will have to take prece-
dence over the others because of the severity of the fiscal
problem. However, while the need for “quick fixes” cannot
be denied, it should be stressed that the structural prob-
lems that continue to eat away at the tax system would
have to be addressed squarely.
The need for additional revenues is immediate but the re-
quirement is by no means short-term in nature. The well-
defined downward trend in tax effort in 1998-2002 indi-
cates that government cannot rely solely on measures that
result in a one-off increase in government revenues (e.g.,
privatization). It is important that government also adopts
tax policy changes that will not hinder the attainment of the
longer term goals of tax reform and those that will yield
some permanent improvement in the tax-to-GDP ratio.
On the other hand, recent experience in tax reform around
the globe tends to put less weight on vertical equity consid-
erations particularly in countries where tax enforcement is
poor. The lesson learned in these places suggests that the
focus should be on fiscal (i.e., tax and expenditure inci-
dence taken together) rather than tax incidence alone. The
shift in emphasis comes from a recognition of the fact that
well-designed progressive taxes may not be worth much when
they are not evenly enforced. In these countries, it is ar-
gued that government’s redistribution function may be bet-
ter served by a progressive expenditure program that is ably
financed by a not-so progressive tax system.
Using these criteria, the following tax measures rank high
on the list: (1) indexation of excise tax on both sin and
petroleum products, (2) rationalization of fiscal incentives,
(3) imposition of an across-the-board-import surcharge, (4)
imposition of excise tax on text messaging, and (5) increase
in the VAT rate. All of these measures yield substantial rev-
enue with low downside risks (Annex Table 1). Needless to
say, all will be painful and none will be popular. In the final
analysis, choosing which of these measures to pursue will
be decided essentially on political grounds. However, be-
cause the magnitude of the fiscal consolidation that is
needed is not small, it is inescapable that tax policy reform,
...All the proposed tax measures will be
painful and none will be popular...However,
because the magnitude of the fiscal
consolidation that is needed is not small, it
is inescapable that tax policy reform,
regardless of the specific measures that will
be implemented, will necessarily have to cost
the administration a considerable amount of
political capital.No. 2004-08 3
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regardless of the specific measures that will be implemented,
will necessarily have to cost the administration a consider-
able amount of political capital.
Indexation of excise tax on sin products
The indexation of the excise tax on sin products is clearly a
must-do if one wants to stop the continuing erosion of the
tax effort. It is notable that the Philippines’ tax rates on sin
products are significantly lower than those in many places
around the world. Moreover, an increase in these rates is
justifiable because of the social costs (in the form of result-
ant additional expenditures on health care services) that
are associated with the consumption of these products.
Indexation of excise tax on petroleum products
In principle, the same arguments that are used to justify the
indexation of the excise tax on sin products are applicable
to the indexation of the excise tax on petroleum products.
Increasing said tax would tend to curtail the environmental
costs (i.e., traffic congestion and air pollution) that are as-
sociated with the consumption of petroleum products. How-
ever, the indexation of the excise tax on petroleum products
presents an additional complication due to the fact that an
increase in petroleum product taxes tends to set off a round
of wage and price increases. This problem could be miti-
gated if the tax increase is coupled with tax rebates to pub-
lic transport and if its implementation is timed with the soft-
ening in the world market price of crude oil.
Other high yield tax measures
If an increase in petroleum product taxes is not deemed to
be acceptable, then government may have to pursue one or
more of the following measures: (1) an across-the-board
import surcharge, (2) an increase in the VAT rate, and (3)
the imposition of excise tax on text messaging. These mea-
sures are by no means perfect candidates for what consti-
tutes a “good tax” but all of them will assure government of
a well-defined revenue stream.
On the one hand, an across-the-board import surcharge will
not affect relative protection across sectors but will likely
turn the terms of trade against exports and lead to some
increase in prices. On the other hand, the increase in the
VAT rate may be difficult to justify given the prevailing leak-
age from the system.1 Increasing the levy on those that are
already caught in the VAT net may in fact discourage tax
compliance. At the same time, the imposition of an excise
tax on text messaging is seen by some as regressive while
others aver that the sumptuary nature of text messaging is
not clear.
Rationalization of fiscal incentives
An important reform that was originally part of the Compre-
hensive Tax Reform Program (CTRP) but which was bypassed
in the legislative mill in 1996/1997 is the rationalization of
the fiscal incentives system. This is unfortunate consider-
ing that the diminution in the tax take arising from the re-
duction in the effective corporate income tax rate under the
CTRP was meant to be compensated for by the potential
revenue gain from the curtailment of fiscal incentives. In
the near term, limiting the coverage of the Investment Pri-
orities Plan (IPP) of the Board of Investments (BOI) by ad-
ministrative action will go a long way in generating additional
revenues. However, the first best approach would require leg-
islative action and would involve the harmonization of incen-
tives provided under various tax incentive laws (numbering
about 100) through the use of a Tax Expenditure Budget.
Broadening of the tax base
Meanwhile, the government should seriously consider the
following proposals that are aimed at broadening the tax
base even if the associated revenue may not be high ini-
tially. These include the use of presumptive income levels
in the computation of the individual income tax liability of
professionals, traders and individual nonwage income earn-
ers and the reduction in the number of VAT-exempt products
and transactions. On the one hand, any analysis of the indi-
vidual income tax system invariably points to the very un-
even tax burden between wage income and nonwage in-
come, thereby indicating the need for the tax system to ef-
fectively expand its ambit to cover so-called hard-to-tax groups
(e.g., professionals, traders, small businessmen).2 The use
________________
1 Estimates indicate that between 26 percent - 38 percent of
potential VAT revenue is not collected.
2 While household income is about evenly split between wage
and nonwage income, the tax take from wage income accounts for
about 80 percent of total individual income tax revenue.August 2004 4
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of presumptive income levels has yielded creditable suc-
cess in other countries and its application should seriously
be considered in the Philippines. This may or may not re-
quire further legislative action since Section 6 of the Na-
tional Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) already allows it. On
the other hand, limiting the number of VAT-exempt products
and transactions will not only broaden the tax base but will
also simplify the administration of the VAT.
Proposals that may be counterproductive
Three of the eight tax measures that are proposed by the
administration are not likely to be helpful. These include:
the adoption of the gross income tax, the imposition of the
windfall tax on telecom companies, and the tax amnesty.
The same is also true of the proposal to reduce the corpo-
rate and individual income tax rates in order to stimulate
supply side effects.
The shift to gross income taxation is perceived by many
sectors (business community, tax practitioners and mem-
bers of academe) to be a bad tax (Box 1). This measure will
not reduce the scope for negotiations between taxpayers
and tax examiners as its proponents aver; rather, it will widen
it. Instead of plugging loopholes, it will create more. More-
over, if the proposal is meant to put a limit on excessive
claims for tax deductions, the NIRC even now permits the
BIR to establish and enforce caps on oft-abused expense
items. Gross income taxation also tends to violate the tax
neutrality principle. Under this scheme, the effective tax
burden of firms will vary according to their cost structures,
with firms in the services sector likely to be hardest hit.
Meanwhile, the imposition of a tax on the windfall profits of
telecommunications firms is another problematic measure.
First, is the sector lightly taxed? It is subject to the income
tax, the value added tax and the percentage tax on over-
seas calls/dispatch of messages. Second, how does one
define “windfall profits/income?” Third, assuming windfall
profits is somehow determined, why penalize a profitable
sector?
With regard to the tax amnesty, the Philippines has granted
tax amnesties much too often and in an almost periodic
fashion in the recent past. The experience has not been
encouraging in terms of its longer-term impact on revenues.
Worse, it may be that these amnesties have come to be
anticipated, thereby sending the signal to taxpayers that
government is unable to enforce taxes. Thus, the practice
creates a disincentive for taxpayers to pay the right taxes
on time.
On the other hand, proponents of the new tax amnesty pro-
posal argue that, unlike previous tax amnesties schemes,
it will provide government with a potent means to build and
widen the tax base because it mandates the filing of a state-
ment of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALNs) by all tax-
payers. The challenge then lies in actually making use of
such information to help improve tax enforcement in the
future. In previous tax amnesties, hopes were likewise raised
that the exercise will allow the BIR to get better information
on the gross receipts/income of taxpayers. However, it ap-
pears that these aspirations did not materialize.
On the proposal to cut the corporate and individual income
tax rates, proponents argue that this will broaden the tax
base because taxpayers will be encouraged to pay the cor-
rect amount of taxes if tax rates are not prohibitive. How-
ever, the proposal is not likely to work unless enforcement
is significantly improved. Moreover, the reduction in the in-
come tax rates under the CTRP has not been found to yield
supply side effects.
Tax administration reform
The improvement of BIR’s tax effort in 2003 resulted pri-
marily from a number of procedural/systems reforms in tax
administration that have been initiated by the incumbent
Commissioner. These consist of the implementation of the
(1) Third Party Information Matching System including the
VAT Reconciliation of Listings for Enforcement (RELIEF) which
helped the BIR identify patterns and discrepancies in tax-
payers’ records, particularly the underdeclaration of their
sales, (2) taxpayer benchmarking, (3) rationalization of the
audit process through the “no-contact audit” scheme and
the conduct of pro-active audits based on deviations from
benchmarks, (4) tax mapping of business establishments,
(5) e-filing and e-payment, and (6) Text-BIR Campaign which
encourages end-consumers to demand official receipts for
goods purchased. The challenge now lies in the institution-No. 2004-08 5
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Box 1. Gross income taxation – why not
Proponents of the shift to gross income taxation aver that changing the tax base from net income to gross income will improve
tax collection by simplifying the system and removing the opportunities for overstating expenses for tax purposes. And pre-
cisely because of this, they say, the move will minimize corruption at the BIR inasmuch as the scope for negotiations between
taxpayers and tax examiners (and the likely harassment of the former by the latter) will be eliminated. Consequently, they
argue that the system will become not only fairer because there is less evasion but will also induce a positive impact on
revenue as supply side effects come into play.
However, the very premises on which the arguments are based in favor of gross income taxation are faulty. First, gross income
taxation does not mean that taxpayers will not be allowed to claim any deductions. In principle, the tax base will be equal to
“gross sales/gross receipts less cost of goods sold/cost of sales.” That is, gross income taxation will still allow taxpayers to
deduct their direct costs from their gross sales/receipts when computing for their tax liability. This means that there will still
be as much room for haggling between taxpayers and tax examiners, if not more under this system. This time, though, they
will haggle on which costs are direct (and therefore, tax deductible) and which costs are indirect (and therefore, not tax
deductible). Firms engaged in the services sector will tend to be more inconvenienced in this regard because the distinction
between direct and indirect costs is not as clear-cut in their case compared to manufacturing enterprises.
Second, a gross income tax is not fair. Because the cost structure of firms in different sectors/industries is widely disparate, the
application of a single rate on their gross income is seen as highly inequitable. The business community1 says that it is not
against the gross income tax system provided it applies a revenue-neutral rate2 for each sector/subsector. Thus, they argue for
the adoption of different rates for different sectors/subsectors. Needless to say, this will make the system more unwieldy and
complex.3 Experience everywhere shows that unfair tax systems breed more evasion. The same is true of more complicated tax
systems.
And third, the bigger source of evasion is not overstatement of expenses but underreporting of sales. From this perspective,
therefore, the policy prescription (shifting to gross income taxation) fails to address the real policy problem.
______________
1 Based on a statement in a paid advertisement of Raul Concepcion’s Consumer and Oil Price Watch in Philippine Star, 19 July 2004, p. 7.
2 A revenue-neutral rate is one that will ensure that a sector’s tax payments will remain the same compared to what it pays under the current
net income tax method.
3 Now, dishonest taxpayers will have the wiggle room to decide not only on how much to pad their expenses but also on which tax rate should
apply to them.
alization of these new procedures and systems in the bu-
reau so as to ensure the continued improvement in its col-
lection efficiency.
Presumptive income levels/expanded withholding tax
system
Prospectively, the use of presumptive income levels essen-
tially by extending the benchmarking exercise as well as the
use of third-party information to individual nonwage income
earners will have to be put in place. Ways of expanding the
withholding tax system to include the hard-to-reach groups
should also be explored.
Performance-driven tax administration
The institutionalization of performance-based contracts not
only for the tax collection agencies but also for its employ-
ees, together with some flexibility in their compensation struc-
ture, will create the appropriate incentive structure in these
agencies. The adoption of the lateral attrition scheme may
help achieve this.
However, the challenge lies in the way the revenue targets
are set and monitored. Alternatively, this could also be
achieved by the creation of an autonomous revenue author-
ity. The experience in other countries suggests, though, that
the success of the latter depends on the degree of indepen-
dence that is provided (Manasan 2003).
Improved management internal control systems
There is also a need to tighten controls in order to ensure
that tax payments made by the public actually reach the
government’s coffers. It is bad enough that the tax collec-August 2004 6
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tion agencies are unable to collect the correct amount of
taxes. It is even worse when voluntary tax payments are
waylaid by tax scams.
Public expenditure management reform
The government has prided itself in having pursued and is
pursuing reforms that promote the operational efficiency of
government agencies. These initiatives include the follow-
ing: (1) procurement reform, (2) the installation of the New
Government Accounting System, (3) the establishment of a
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), (4) the shift
towards performance-based budgeting under the Organiza-
tional Performance Indicator Framework (OPIF), and (5) the
institutionalization of the Sector Effectiveness and Efficiency
Review (SEER). These are important reforms and should be
sustained.
The passage of Republic Act (RA) 9184 (or the Procurement
Act) is laudable and is expected to enhance transparency
and public accountability in government procurement. At this
point, it is important to continuously monitor its implemen-
tation and impact.
On the other hand, progress on the other reforms mentioned
above has been rather slow, stymied perhaps by the uncer-
tainty in the government’s fiscal situation. For instance, it
should be noted that the success of the MTEF is greater
when revenues are predictable. Conversely, the MTEF is dif-
ficult to implement in an unstable environment precisely
because trying to extend the budget horizon when there is
severe revenue uncertainty leads to frequent changes in
expenditure ceilings, thereby discrediting the MTEF exercise
itself (Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi 1999).
On the other hand, the operationalization of both the OPIF
and SEER are hampered by the difficulties in defining what
“results” for which government agencies should be made
accountable. Oftentimes, the confusion centers on the dis-
tinction between outputs and outcomes.
In this regard, studies that will help establish the link be-
tween outcomes and specific outputs as well as those that
will shed light on the relative effectiveness of alternative
interventions (i.e., those that establish the link between
outcomes and the outputs of alternative interventions) are
needed. The determination of standard unit costs should
likewise be strengthened. In this way, cost-benefit analysis
and/or cost effectiveness analysis can be undertaken to
better inform the performance budgeting process.
GOCC reform
Reform in the GOCC sector, meanwhile, may include: (1) de-
politicization of rate setting (e.g., NPC, MRT/LRT, PNCC,
etc.), (2) regulatory reform (e.g., MWSS), and (3) divest-
ment of government ownership in activities that are patently
private in nature (e.g., commercial banks, television stations).
Other proposals
In addition, other proposals aimed at containing the fiscal
deficit have been advanced. These include: (1) reduction of
the IRA share of LGUs, and (2) creation of an Infrastructure
Corporation that will leverage funds from the private sector
to finance public infrastructure.
The reduction of the LGUs’ IRA share is risky for two rea-
sons. First, the Local Government Code provides that such
a reduction can only be done if the national government has
an “unmanageable fiscal deficit.” If the national government
admits to this, negative reactions from the market would be
forthcoming and may result in higher interest payments for
the government. Second, horizontal imbalance character-
izes the IRA distribution which means that some LGUs (about
half) get more IRA than they need to fund the functions that
were devolved to them while other LGUs receive less IRA
than they need. An across-the-board cut in the IRA will ad-
versely affect the ability of many LGUs (particularly those
with small local tax base) to provide devolved basic services.
Finally, the creation of an Infrastructure Corporation is not
necessary to encourage private sector participation in the
financing of public infrastructure. The BOT law already de-
fines such arrangements although some refinements might
be in order.3 “Corporatization,” especially if the new entity
______________
3 This is especially true in reference to the provisions governing
the availability of national government debt guarantee to loans of
BOT projects and the setting of reasonable rate of return for unso-
licited and negotiated projects.No. 2004-08 7
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is undercapitalized, may create moral hazard and result in
even larger contingent liabilities.
Conclusion
Reforms, while meant to put things in order, are always
painful. More so when a large number of sectors are af-
fected in the process. The proposed measures outlined in
the above discussion all have their painful repercussions.
But the country’s precarious fiscal position is something
that calls for drastic and radical solutions.
And only a government with an adequate political will and
the willingness to “bite the bullet” despite being faced with
unpopular decisions to make, can pass the grade in over-
coming such a problem.      
Annex Table 1. New tax measures
Tax measure Revenue Remarks
Impact 
(billion PhP)  
Indexation of excise tax 4.7 relatively easy to collect; small number of collection points; can be justified on the
on alcoholic products grounds that consumption impose social costs on rest of economy in the form of
Indexation of excise tax 7.4 additional health care/police services  
on tobacco products    
Indexation of excise tax on 12.1    
sin products to 1997 levels  
Indexation of excise tax     politically sensitive product; price increase tends to trigger increase in wages and
on petroleum products     prices of other products; current wave of price increases in international market make
(a) 25% increase - P1.10/ P0.40 5.3 this reform doubly difficult; question of timing – should government wish to impose it,
(b) 50% increase - P2.20 / P0.80 10.7 doing so should be timed with softening of prices in world market; may be coupled
(c) 100% increase - P4.4/ P1.60  21.3 with rebates to public transport to improve social acceptability; can be justified
     (full indexation to 1997 levels)     because of environmental costs (i.e., pollution and congestion) associated with its use
(d) across the board PhP1 per liter  17.0  
Rationalization of fiscal incentives 14.0a focus on limiting coverage to exports and one or two industry groups; harmonize
    various tax incentive laws thru tax expenditure budget
Imposition of excise tax on text sumptuary nature of text messaging unclear; easy to collect; small number of
messaging collection points
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Annex Table 1 (cont’d.)
Tax measure Revenue Remarks
Impact 
(billion PhP)
(a) 1 centavo  0.9b
(b) 10 centavos 9.1b  
(c) 20 centavos 18.3b  
Imposition of across-the-board  would not affect relative protection across industries; may be inflationary; may be
import surcharge implemented by administrative action without need of legislation
(a) 1% 8.0  
(b) 2% 16.0
Increase in VAT rate may be hard to justify given prevailing evasion at existing tax rate; but may be needed
(a) from 10% to 12% 14.9 given difficulty in raising revenues from other sources
(b) from 10% to 14% 29.8    
Reduction in number of VAT- exempt  4.0c broadens the VAT base; will tend to ease VAT administration; in line with
products including petroleum products international practice
Use of presumptive income levels for  broaden tax base to include hard-to-tax groups; make individual tax system more
professionals/traders equitable
Shift to gross income taxation      not consistent with neutrality of tax system, i.e., one that avoids interfering with
resource allocation decision of private sector; does not really reduce venue for
tax negotiation between taxpayers and tax examiners 
Imposition of tax on windfall profits Is the sector lightly taxed? If not, why penalize a profitable sector
of telecommunication firms
Imposition of franchise tax on  5.0d frequent tax regime change will not sit well with industry
telecommunications firms in lieu 
of the VAT
Increase in motor vehicle tax Revenue earmarked for road maintenance; increase partly explained by inflation
(or road users tax) adjustment 
(a) 25% increase 1.6
(b) 50% increase 3.2
Imposition/increase in tax on luxury 0.8e improves progressivity of tax system; may take the form of higher excise tax on
items automobiles; coverage may be expanded to include other items; is it worth the effort?
Increase in minimum gross receipts  4.1 levels set in 1976 yet
for common carriers tax
Reduction in corporate/individual      tricky; not likely to work unless enforcement is significantly improved; reduction in
income tax rate     CIT and IIT under CTRP did not yield supply side effects 
Grant of tax amnesty Philippines granted 16 amnesties in last 14 years; results not encouraging;
disincentive effects on timely payment of correct taxes
Institutionalize performance-driven  may be linked with creation of autonomous revenue authority but not necessarily;
systems in tax collection agencies     application of lateral attrition
Creation of autonomous revenue     experience elsewhere shows mixed result with respect to revenue effect
authority    negative  revenue  impact in first year likely; long-term revenue impact unclear
Increase fees and charges 4.3f  
arevenue loss from BOI-approved incentives in 2003 (National Tax Research Center)
bassumes 200 million text messages sent per day
crevenue estimate refers to petroleum products alone
dassumes 7% franchise tax
erefers to 50% increase in rates but same coverage
fassumes 10% increase